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Covering The Uninsured: What
Is It Worth?
An attempt to place a value on what it costs a person, and society,
when health insurance is lacking.
by Wilhelmine Miller, Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor, and Willard G.
Manning
ABSTRACT: One out of six Americans under age sixty-five lacks health insurance, a situation that imposes sizable hidden costs upon society. The poorer health and shorter lives of
those without coverage account for most of these costs. Other impacts are manifested by
Medicare and disability support payments, demands on the public health infrastructure,
and losses of local health service capacity. We conclude that the estimated value of health
forgone each year because of uninsurance ($65–$130 billion) constitutes a lower-bound
estimate of economic losses resulting from the present level of uninsurance nationally.

D

u r i n g t h e pa s t q ua rt e r - c e n t u ry the rate of uninsurance for the
U.S. population under age sixty-five has remained relatively constant, fluctuating between 15 and 18 percent. Our voluntary and predominantly
employment-based approach to coverage for the nonelderly population contributes to the persistence of this large pool of uninsured people. One reason policymakers have not acted to ensure universal coverage is that they have not appreciated the costs of the status quo.
In a series of six reports, the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM’s) Committee on the
Consequences of Uninsurance weighed evidence about the adverse impacts of
uninsurance and, when possible, estimated the monetary value of these costs for
individuals, families, communities, and society overall.1 This paper presents the
economic cost analysis of the committee’s June 2003 report, Hidden Costs, Value Lost:
Uninsurance in America.

The Cost Of Uninsurance
Simply put, economic costs are the value of resources devoted to one purpose
that are not then available for alternative uses—the resources’ opportunity cost.
The IOM committee examined the resource costs that stem from the nation’s high
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rate of uninsurance from the most comprehensive perspective, that of society
overall. The societal perspective theoretically includes costs borne by all members
of society, including individuals, families, health care facilities, communities, and
other organizations. The societal perspective includes collective losses, such as diminished health services capacity in communities with relatively high rates of
uninsurance. Societal costs thus are much broader than governmental program
costs or private individual and institutional expenditures.
Probably the greatest cost of the lack of health insurance is the poorer health
and shorter lives of people without coverage. Conversely, the greatest benefit of
universal coverage would likely be the improvements in health and longevity
among those who otherwise would be uninsured. Throughout this paper, unless
otherwise defined, “cost” refers to resource losses that follow from the current
level of uninsurance in the United States. Worse health among the uninsured,
however, is only one of several adverse outcomes of the lack of health insurance
within a population. Lack of coverage also exposes people to financial risk and uncertainty. Also, it can have deleterious spillover effects across a community, contributing to the loss of certain kinds of health services, less effective control of
communicable disease, and losses to the local economic base.2
The consequences of uninsurance can be categorized as costs to private entities—including individuals, families, and firms—or as spillover costs that affect
society more generally (Exhibit 1). Some of these are true economic costs (such as
the worse health of those lacking coverage). Others, such as higher taxes or diversion of public resources, are partially transfers among actors in the economy (for
example, some of the value of uncompensated care that hospitals and physicians
EXHIBIT 1
Costs Consequent To Uninsurance
Internal or private costs
(for individuals, families, and firms)
Greater morbidity and premature mortality
Developmental losses for children
Family financial uncertainty and stress, depletion of
assets (resource and transfer costs)
Lost income of uninsured breadwinner in ill health
Workplace productivity losses (absenteeism, reduced
efficiency on the job)
Diminished sense of social equality and self-respect

External or spillover costs
Diminished quality and availability of personal health
services
Diminished public health system capacity
Diminished population health (such as higher rates of
vaccine-preventable disease)
Higher taxes, budget cuts, loss of other uses for public
revenues diverted to uncompensated care (primarily
transfer costs, except for administrative costs)
Higher public program costs connected with worse
health (Medicare, disability payments) (primarily
transfer costs)
Diminished workforce productivity
Diminished social capital; unfulfilled social norms of
caring, equal opportunity, and mutual respect

SOURCE: Adapted from Institute of Medicine Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, Hidden Costs, Value Lost:
Uninsurance in America (Washington: National Academies Press, 2003), 31, Figure 2.2.
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provide to the uninsured) and are thus a matter of distribution rather than a cost.
In this paper we present our estimate of the value of health lost due to uninsurance; contrast that value with an estimate of the additional investment in
health services that would remedy the worse health outcomes of those now uninsured; and then discuss other, mostly unquantified, economic costs. We conclude
by offering some reasons for the failure of private actions to achieve the societally
superior outcome of universal coverage, identifying limitations of the analysis, and
drawing some policy implications.

Valuing Health Outcomes
Perhaps the greatest cost to society of a large uninsured population is the increased mortality and worse health of the uninsured. Because the value of health is
not easily derived from market prices, estimating this cost is challenging. Furthermore, health is multidimensional and thus difficult to define and measure. In addition to mortality, which is easy to measure, health encompasses physical and mental well-being and functioning.
We use the concept of health capital to capture these aspects of health. Health
capital is analogous to human capital, a concept used in labor economics. Human
capital is “cashed out” as the present value of the income one can expect to receive
over the course of one’s life as a function of one’s stock of knowledge. Having a
better education allows a person to earn more in the future. Similarly, having more
health makes a person happier and longer lived. Health capital is the present value
of the utility resulting from a person’s expected lifetime stock of health.3
n Estimating health capital. Health capital accounts for the value that people
have for their lives and health beyond their future earnings. Estimating this value involves collapsing the elements of health into a quality-adjusted life expectancy and
assigning this estimate a dollar value. To do this, we rate a person’s health-related
quality of life (HRQL) on a scale ranging from 0 (for death) to 1 (for perfect health).
Any diseases or impairments reduce this HRQL weight so it falls somewhere in the
0–1 range. A year in a health state with a particular HRQL weight is referred to as a
quality-adjusted life year (QALY).4 For any given year in the future, the expected
QALY is the sum of each probability that a person will have a particular disease profile that year multiplied by the expected HRQL from having that set of diseases.
These expected QALYs are then discounted at a rate of 3 percent to their present values and summed to yield a quality-adjusted life expectancy.5
If there are only two possible health states, perfect health (HRQL = 1) and death
(HRQL = 0), then the expected QALY for a given year in the future is simply the
probability that a person is alive in that year. Summing these QALYs over all future
years without discounting yields remaining life expectancy. The measure of health
capital we use starts with this approach and incorporates discounting and health
states other than perfect health.
To incorporate morbidity into the measure of health capital, we used data on fif-
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teen chronic conditions from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and
the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) database. We calculated
the prevalence of these conditions by age and sex. Using an ordered probit model
with self-reported health as the dependent variable, we estimated QALY weights
for each condition. The coefficient on the variable indicating that a person has a
particular condition tells us how the presence of that condition moves one along
the scale of self-reported health, holding constant demographic characteristics
and other reported health conditions. These coefficients were then scaled to 0–1 to
yield the QALY weights.6 Life expectancy, disease prevalence, and QALY weights
were then combined as described above into a measure of discounted, qualityadjusted life expectancy.
For the analysis in Hidden Costs, Value Lost, we monetized this estimate by multiplying the quality-adjusted life expectancy by the value of a year in perfect health.
A vast literature on the value of a statistical life (VSL) has developed in response to
government agencies’ need to evaluate the relative costs and benefits of health,
safety, and environmental regulation. The value of an individual life year has received little attention, however.
n Valuing a life year. How much for a year of healthy life? Values of a life year
used in research and by government agencies vary widely. We use a value of
$160,000 for a year in perfect health based on a recent survey of VSL studies.7 This
value is derived from a subset of VSL studies that use a stated willingness-to-pay
methodology. This methodology uses surveys to measure a person’s willingness to
pay for a small reduction in the risk of death, which is then used to impute the implied value of a life. According to economic theory, willingness to pay should capture the full value a person places on his or her life, incorporating both earnings and
the enjoyment of living itself.
Estimating willingness to pay is preferable to using a human capital approach,
which values a life at the discounted sum of all future earnings.8 The human capital approach ignores the undesirability (disutility) of poor health, except for
forgone earnings, and it does not factor in the value of time spent not working.
Thus, human capital underestimates the benefits of health gains.
Our value of a life year corresponds to a lifetime VSL of $4.8 million, assuming a
3 percent discount rate and a constant value for years over the life span. This is
within the range of VSL estimates reported in the literature. One comprehensive
review of the VSL literature produces a range of VSL estimates clustered between
$3.8 and $9 million.9 A recent meta-analysis of certain willingness-to-pay studies
finds a median VSL in the United States of $6.7 million.10 Our implied VSL is also
consistent with the range of values used by government agencies.11
Recent studies that have used the value of a life year to measure benefits have
used a wide range of estimates. One “rule of thumb” value of a statistical life year
frequently cited in studies of clinical outcomes is $100,000; however, this is outdated and is not based on a systematic review of the literature.12 The U.S. Environ-
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mental Protection Agency (EPA) has used a value of $172,000 per life year for people under age age sixty-five and $434,000 for people over age sixty-five in several
recent analyses, and this approach has been endorsed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).13 Unlike the EPA, we use a constant value of a life year
regardless of age, sex, race or ethnicity, educational attainment, or income. We do
this for equity reasons and because little is known about how the value of a life
year varies across individuals and over the life span.14
n Measuring differences in health capital. The value of health forgone because of uninsurance is measured as the difference in health capital between the insured and the uninsured. Ideally, all differences between these groups that affect
health outcomes—other than insurance status—should be factored out of the analysis. In practice, this is difficult. Unobserved factors may account for effects attributed to having or lacking health insurance. Based on its previous systematic review
of outcomes studies, the IOM committee concluded that attributing an excess mortality risk of 25 percent to the uninsured population ages 1–65 was reasonable.15 An
independent review of the health outcomes literature supports this assumption.16
More recent longitudinal analyses comparing mortality outcomes for insured and
uninsured populations are beginning to be reported, and they should soon support
better estimates of the relative mortality risks of these groups.17
It was not possible, with our cross-sectional data, to estimate the true difference in morbidity by insurance status. Thus, two sets of analyses bound the estimates. First, we assumed that there was no difference in morbidity by insurance
status. The effect of insurance on health capital using this approach reflects only
the mortality differential. This provides a lower bound. In the second scenario, we
assumed that the entire measured difference in health was attributable to insurance status. Because some unmeasured characteristics that correlate with insurance status are likely, this estimate provides an upper bound of the possible gains
in health from insuring the uninsured.
We found that the average uninsured person forgoes between $1,645 and $3,280
of health capital for each year without insurance coverage. These estimates vary by
age and sex. In the aggregate, for roughly forty million uninsured Americans, we
estimate the value of health forgone per year without coverage at $65–$130 billion.
This range reflects our lower- and upper-bound approaches, but it still involves
considerable uncertainty. However, while different assumptions could yield
higher or lower estimates, the assumptions used should produce conservative estimates. For example, the analysis assumes no permanent adverse impacts to health
as a result of any previous spells of uninsurance. At any given age, adverse events
prior to that age do not affect future health. Thus, we do not take into account potential gains to individuals, Medicare, or subsequent private insurers from eliminating persistent health problems from the previously uninsured. We also assume
that a person faces the average probability of being uninsured at a given age as it
existed in 2000–2001, while rates of uninsurance are on an upward trend.

H E A LT H A F F A I R S ~ We b E x c l u s i v e

W4-161

Th e

Uni n su r ed

Remedying The Health Deficit Of Uninsured Americans
What would it cost to eliminate the differences in health care use between insured and uninsured people who are otherwise similar (and thus improve the
health outcomes of the uninsured)? Economists Jack Hadley and John Holahan estimated the net (new) societal costs of providing uninsured Americans with the
kind and amount of health care used by those with either public coverage (principally Medicaid) or private insurance.18 Their simulation of the projected health
care spending if the currently uninsured U.S. population were insured produced
net new annual costs in 2001 dollars of $34 billion–$69 billion, with public or private coverage, respectively.19 Other simulations have produced incremental cost
estimates for providing the uninsured population with an “insured” level of health
care that fall within this range.20
These estimates assume nothing about the efficiency or appropriateness of the
care used by publicly or privately insured populations; they include any excess or
inappropriate use that having coverage could promote and thus represent upper
bounds on the additional service costs of achieving the health benefits of coverage.
Therefore, the social investment required to extend an insured level of health care
to the uninsured is likely to produce gains in better health and longevity (valued at
$65–$130 billion annually) well in excess of the incremental societal costs of increased use of services.

Other Costs Of Uninsurance
In addition to economic losses resulting from the worse health of the uninsured,
uninsurance has several other effects that have not been well documented and are
difficult to quantify. We review these briefly below.
n Financial risk and uncertainty. Lack of coverage increases the unpredictability of medical expenses and the potential for financial catastrophe, including bankruptcy. The social stigma and psychological stresses of medical indigency, health
care debt, and bill collection efforts are themselves burdensome.21 Financial planning is problematic for families with uninsured members, who face uncertain but
potentially great liability for future medical expenses. Even for the majority of
Americans who have coverage, maintaining it is not a sure thing, and the prospect of
losing it can cause anxiety.
Overall, the uninsured spend much less on health care than comparable people
with coverage spend. However, uninsured individuals and families pay a larger
share of their health care expenses (excluding premium payments) out of pocket
than those who have coverage, and uninsured families are more likely than insured
families to have high out-of-pocket expenses as a proportion of family income.22
Despite the financial burden imposed by lack of coverage, the estimated value of
the financial risk protection that health insurance would have for currently uninsured people is surprisingly low. This follows from the fact that the uninsured pay
for just 7 percent of the cost of any hospital services they use.23 This pure insurance
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value of coverage, the risk premium, is calculated as a function of the reduction in
the variability of expected expenditures that having coverage achieves. Because
incurred expenses for hospital and other high-cost care for the most part go unpaid by uninsured patients, the variance in actual out-of-pocket health spending
within the uninsured population is low. These incurred but unpaid bills are absorbed as bad debt or count as charity care, and they are financed largely by the
federal, state, and local governments through institutional operating subsidies.24
A working group of the IOM committee estimated that the annual value of the risk
premium for the currently uninsured population is $40–$80 per capita, or roughly
$1.6–$3.2 billion for forty million uninsured people.25
n Spillover costs. We have not been able to assign dollar values to the spillover
costs or measure the distributional impact (that is, transfer costs) of the current
rates of uninsurance. The information needed to determine the impact of uninsurance on public expenditures, on the commercial economies of communities, and
on the U.S. social and political climate has not been collected. Other spillover effects
include diversion of public health resources, reduced availability of primary and specialty health care services, and diminished economic vitality.26
Three areas of public spending—Medicare, disability income and medical care
support, and criminal justice—bear some degree of excess costs because of the less
appropriate care and worse health of the uninsured.
Medicare. Medicare ensures virtually universal coverage of the population age
sixty-five and older. Little research to date has looked at how use of Medicare benefits might differ between previously insured and previously uninsured beneficiaries. Some researchers hypothesize that previously uninsured beneficiaries are
sicker and thus use services more intensively once they are enrolled in Medicare
than do those who have been continuously insured.27
Disability. To the extent that the lack of coverage contributes to the development
of disabling health conditions and claims for disability income support, some of
the cost of disability determination, benefits administration, and the behavioral
responses to taxes financing the payments can be attributed to uninsurance.
Mental illness. Adults with severe mental illnesses (such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder) are uninsured at a rate comparable to that of all adults under age
sixty-five: 20 percent. Those who lack coverage are less likely to receive appropriate, ongoing treatment. Untreated people with these mental illnesses are more
likely to manifest behavior that lands them in jail or prison.28 Incarcerating people
with psychotic symptoms is costly and therapeutically inappropriate. Perversely,
however, someone with a severe mental illness is more likely to receive specialized
mental health services once he or she comes in contact with the criminal justice
system than before.29 Continuous coverage for people with severe mental illness,
by increasing the likelihood of appropriate treatment, could reduce justice system
costs and provide greater public order and safety.
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Why Haven’t Private Choices Eliminated Uninsurance?
If universal coverage offers superior economic value, why has our society not
achieved it? If having health insurance improves health and extends life, and if productivity increases as a result, why are not all businesses willing to purchase—or
why does not every employee demand—health insurance? Importantly, our analysis divorces the value of health insurance for the uninsured, measured as gains in
health capital, from people’s ability to pay for coverage out of their incomes. This
choice reflects the IOM committee’s ethical judgment that healthy years of life
should be valued equally for all members of society. Building equity into the calculation of benefits from coverage also implies the need for a collective solution.
As for individuals and family decisionmakers, employees may prefer higher
wages over health coverage. The trade-off between wages and benefits is most
stark for workers with low incomes: More than 40 percent of full-time workers
who earn less than $10,000 annually are uninsured, whereas just 5 percent of those
earning more than $50,000 remain uninsured.30 In addition, not everyone anticipates financial benefits from having health insurance, and some then forgo the
spreading of risk that insurance provides.
From the employer perspective, high job turnover rates may discourage employers’ investments in their employees’ health. Nearly 20 percent of employees
were on the job for less than a year in 1996.31 Long-duration employment has been
declining more rapidly for less educated workers, the group at greatest risk of being uninsured and of becoming unemployed and thus losing coverage. Employers
may also underinvest in the health of their employees if part of the benefit occurs
as changes in morbidity and mortality after retirement. Those benefits and cost reductions accrue to the individual and to Medicare, but not to the firm.
The costs and benefits of health insurance are so fragmented and variable that
even within the class of employers or that of workers, the net benefit of coverage
that occurs in the aggregate may not be realized by the subgroup. To the extent
that private (individual or employer) gains are less than private costs, this contributes to underinvestment by both employer and employee. Similarly, the individual
may not be willing to invest in health insurance because he or she may not be
aware of its expected benefits to health.

Limitations Of This Analysis
Although this analysis of the economic costs of uninsurance takes a broader
view of costs related to the lack of coverage, it provides only part of the picture
needed for delineating the implications of any policy alternative that achieves universal coverage. Some parts of the picture still need to be filled in.
First, evaluating the economic cost impacts from the point of view of society reveals little about the distributive effects of universal health insurance coverage relative to the status quo. We do know that those who would otherwise be uninsured would be the primary beneficiaries of their own improved health and that
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“The political implications of endemic uninsurance in the United
States are elusive but vital to our well-being as a nation.”
this improved health and longevity has substantial economic value. The incidence
of new economic costs attributable to greater use of health care by the previously
uninsured, as well as the shifts in financing affecting current sponsors of uncompensated care, cannot be projected in the absence of a specific proposal.
Second, this analysis does not encompass all aspects of health care finance that
affect systemwide costs. It does not consider public subsidies to health insurance
coverage (the deductibility of health insurance premium payments from income
taxes), which amount to $120–$160 billion annually.32 Neither does it address the
administrative and allocative inefficiencies of current financing mechanisms.33
Third, our results depend on several strong underlying assumptions and
choices, such as the discount rate, the value of a healthy life year, and the construction of the QALY weights. Further, the observed difference in health outcomes between the insured and uninsured may be affected by unmeasured differences between these groups that will not change when the uninsured gain coverage.34
Finally, we have relatively crude measures of uninsurance and of its effects on
health. For example, we do not know how length of time without coverage or how
sporadic coverage affects health. While information about patterns of coverage
and periods of uninsurance is improving, rarely is it related to information about
health outcomes.35

Policy Implications
This analysis of the societal costs of uninsurance is a first attempt to take a comprehensive look at the opportunity costs of our nation’s patchwork, voluntaristic
approach to health insurance that leaves so many without coverage. While sizable
gaps in information remain to be filled, the initial effort of the IOM committee recommends a structure and scope for subsequent economic analyses. Researchers
and policymakers are coming late to calculating the human and financial costliness of business as usual in health coverage policy. Our ignorance is as much a result of not asking the right questions as it is of the inadequacy of data and of the
available explanatory models for health and productivity outcomes.
The political implications of endemic uninsurance in the United States are elusive but vital to our strength and well-being as a nation. Because uninsured people
are less likely than those with coverage to receive effective and appropriate health
care, the resulting gap between the health outcomes of people who have coverage
and those who do not exacerbates disparities in health status across society.36
These disparities, and the difficulties that those who lack health insurance have in
obtaining appropriate and respectful care, undermine deeply rooted ideals of
equality of opportunity and equality of respect in the U.S. political culture.
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Policymakers at all levels of government are understandably concerned with
reconciling program spending with revenues collected. Federal policymakers in
particular, however, should supplement their customary budgetary view to take
in the full picture of the societal costs and benefits of alternative national coverage
scenarios. This broader perspective will demonstrate that an investment in universal coverage is very much worth making.
The authors acknowledge the contributions of members of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on the
Consequences of Uninsurance, the Subcommittee on Societal Costs of Uninsured Populations, IOM staff members
Dianne Wolman and Lynne Snyder, and consultants Eugene Moyer and Hanns Kuttner to the work presented here,
and thank two anonymous reviewers who offered many valuable comments on an earlier draft.
NOTES
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

Members of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee included cochairs Mary Sue Coleman and Arthur Kellermann, Ronald M. Andersen, John Z. Ayanian, Robert Blendon, Sheila P. Davis, George Eads,
Sandra Hernández, Willard G. Manning, James J. Mongan (chair of the Subcommittee on Societal Costs of
Uninsured Populations), Christopher Queram, Shoshanna Sofaer, Stephen J. Trejo, Reed V. Tuckson, Edward H. Wagner, and Lawrence Wallack. Additional members of the Subcommittee on Societal Costs
were Norman Daniels, Sherry Glied, Jack Hadley, Ruby P. Hearn, Emmett Keeler, Jack Needleman, and
Gordon Trapnell. Reports in the series are Coverage Matters: Insurance and Health Care (Washington: National
Academies Press, 2001); Care without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late (Washington: National Academies Press,
2002); Health Insurance Is a Family Matter (Washington: National Academies Press, 2002); A Shared Destiny:
Community Effects of Uninsurance (Washington: National Academies Press, 2003); Hidden Costs, Value Lost:
Uninsurance in America (Washington: National Academies Press, 2003); and Insuring America’s Health: Principles
and Recommendations (Washington: National Academies Press, 2004).
IOM, A Shared Destiny.
We use the approach developed in D.M. Cutler and E. Richardson, “Measuring the Health of the United
States Population,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1997), 217–271.
R.J. Zeckhauser and D.S. Shepard, “Where Now for Saving Lives?” Law and Contemporary Problems 40, no. 4
(1976): 5–45.
Three percent is the discount rate recommended in M. Gold et al., Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
This was done by dividing the coefficient by the difference between the maximum and minimum predicted probit score in the sample. See E.R. Vigdor, “Coverage Does Matter: The Value of Health Forgone by
the Uninsured,” in IOM, Hidden Costs, Value Lost, for more detail.
R.A. Hirth et al., “Willingness to Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In Search of a Standard,” Medical Decision Making 20, no. 3 (2000): 332–342.
See D.P. Rice, T.A. Hodgson, and A.N. Kopstein, “The Economic Costs of Illness: A Replication and Update,” Health Care Financing Review 6, no. 1 (1985): 61–80.
W.K. Viscusi, “The Value of Risks to Life and Health,” Journal of Economic Literature 31, no. 4 (1993):
1912–1946; updated to 2000 dollars.
W.K. Viscusi and J. Aldy, “The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates throughout the World,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27, no. 1 (2003): 5–76.
See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, Pub. no. EPA 240-R00-003 (Washington: EPA, 2000); and U.S. Department of Transportation, Revised Departmental Guidelines:
Treatment of Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic Evaluations (Washington: DOT, 2002).
The arbitrariness of this benchmark value is discussed in G. Tolley, D. Kenkel, and R. Fabian, eds., Valuing
Health for Policy: An Economic Approach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
Memorandum of John D. Graham, administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget, to the President’s Management Council, “Benefit-Cost Methods and Lifesaving
Rules” (30 May 2003), www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/pmc_benefit_cost_memo.pdf (18 March 2004);

W4-166

31 March 2004

Va l u e

14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

Of

Cov er age

and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Technical Addendum: Methodologies for the Benefit Analysis
of the Clear Skies Act of 2003,” www.epa.gov/clearskies/clearskies_03tech_adden.pdf (19 November
2003).
The OMB acknowledges this in Graham, memorandum.
IOM, Care without Coverage; and IOM, Health Insurance Is a Family Matter.
J. Hadley, “Sicker and Poorer: The Consequences of Being Uninsured: A Review of the Research on the Relationship between Health Insurance, Medical Care Use, Health, Work, and Income,” Medical Care Research
and Review 60 (Supplement 2, 2003): 3S–75S.
See R. Kronick, “Commentary,” Medical Care Research and Review 60 (Supplement 2, 2003): 100S–122S. We
interpret the author’s results as confirmation of the IOM committee’s assumptions.
J. Hadley and J. Holahan, “Covering the Uninsured: How Much Would It Cost?” Health Affairs, 4 June 2003,
content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w3.250 (5 June 2003).
We acknowledge that any program that would cover the uninsured could very well increase governmental outlays by more than $69 billion because of shifts in costs among payers.
See S.H. Long and M.S. Marquis, “The Uninsured ‘Access Gap’ and the Cost of Universal Coverage,” Health
Affairs 13, no. 2 (1994): 211–220; and G.E Miller, J.S. Banthin and J.F. Moeller, Covering the Uninsured: Estimates
of the Impact on Total Health Expenditures for 2002 (Rockville, Md.: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality,
2003).
L. Lagnado, “Hospitals Try Extreme Measures to Collect Their Overdue Debts,” Wall Street Journal, 30 October 2003.
IOM, Hidden Costs, Value Lost.
Ibid.
See J. Hadley and J. Holahan, “How Much Medical Care Do the Uninsured Use, and Who Pays for It?”
Health Affairs, 12 February 2003, content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/hlthaff.w3.66 (13 February
2003).
Calculations were made by Sherry Glied, Columbia University, from merged Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) files for 1996–1998 prepared by Jack Hadley, Urban Institute.
IOM, A Shared Destiny.
See IOM, Care without Coverage, for documentation of this phenomenon with Medicare end-stage renal disease (ESRD) beneficiaries.
P. Ditton, Mental Health and Treatment of Inmate and Probationers, Pub. no. NCJ 174463 (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, 1999).
D.D. McAlpine and D. Mechanic, “Utilization of Specialty Mental Health Care among Persons with Severe
Mental Illness: The Roles of Demographics, Need, Insurance, and Risk,” Health Services Research 35, no. 1,
Part 2 (2000): 277–282; and Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Criminalization of People with Mental Illnesses: The Role of Mental Health Courts in System Reform (Washington: Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, 2003).
C. Hoffman and M. Wang, Health Insurance Coverage in America: 2001 Data Update (Washington: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, January 2003).
H.S. Farber, “Mobility and Stability: The Dynamics of Job Change in Labor Markets,” Working Paper no.
400 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, June 1998).
L.E. Burman et al., “Tax Incentives for Health Insurance,” Discussion Paper no. 12 (Washington: Urban Institute, May 2003).
For example, administrative workers now account for 27 percent of the U.S. health care labor force. Current financing arrangements also include deadweight loss from distortions in incentives. S. Woolhandler,
T. Campbell, and D.U. Himmelstein, “Costs of Health Care Administration in the United States and Canada,” New England Journal of Medicine 349, no. 8 (2003): 768–775.
See H. Levy and D. Melzer, “What Do We Really Know about Whether Health Insurance Affects Health?”
in Health Policy and the Uninsured, ed. C. McLaughlin (Washington: Urban Institute Press, 2004).
See P.F. Short and D.R. Graefe, “Battery-Powered Health Insurance? Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured,” Health Affairs 22, no. 6 (2003): 244–255.
IOM, Care without Coverage.

H E A LT H A F F A I R S ~ We b E x c l u s i v e

W4-167

